The Cost of Disobeying the Empire: Upheaval for Bangladesh
During the summer of 2024, the world witnessed a student-led movement in Bangladesh come to a head when the then-Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, resigned and fled to India, followed by the installation of Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim government. This seemingly positive change has complex implications regarding national sovereignty and foreign influence in domestic affairs. The exit of Hasina and the Awami League, followed by the new appointment of Muhammad Yunus, may seem like a win for the Bangladeshi population. Still, a closer inspection of the events that have transpired begs wariness from the people of the Global South.
Since Bangladesh fought and won its independence from Pakistan in 1971, a quota system was in place reserving 30% of public sector jobs for those who fought in the liberation War and, since 1997, their children and, since 2010, their grandchildren. Quotas have also been in place for various disadvantaged and underrepresented groups. In Bangladesh, government positions are highly coveted and more sought out than private sector positions due to the former offering job security, social prestige, pensions, and a lighter workload. The quota system, intended to address historical injustices, soon became a flashpoint as economic realities and youth unemployment intensified tensions. The youth unemployment rate, the percentage of persons between the ages of 15 and 24 who are actively looking for work but are not currently employed, has steadily climbed since 2010 and reached a high of 15.74% in 2023. Thus, the quota system has been a point of contention for many years, with student protest movements breaking out in 2008, 2013, 2018, and most recently in the summer of 2024.
To avoid an escalation of the student protest movement seeking to reform the quota system, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced in 2018 that the quotas would be abolished for mid- and high-level executive and administrative roles, also known as first- and second-class posts. At the time, 30% of government jobs were reserved for the descendants of freedom fighters, 10% for women, 10% for candidates from underdeveloped districts, 5% for ethnic minorities, and 1% for the disabled, leaving 44% reserved for fully merit-based appointments. The decision to abolish the quota system was made effective in 2020 despite the student movement’s goal of reforming the quota system and its disavowal of complete abolition. Tensions returned when, on June 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated the quota system, declaring the 2018 decision illegal. Sheikh Hasina’s administration appealed this decision and was able to obtain a status quo order from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court on July 10, 2024. The status quo order would reinstate the quota system but keep quota positions at 7%, with 5% reserved for descendants of freedom fighters.
Nationwide protests had moved beyond demands regarding the quota system and were now calling for Hasina’s resignation in part due to harsh and violent government responses to the protests that led to the deaths of hundreds of protesters. The situation continued to escalate, and on August 5, as the protesters marched to Hasina’s residence, reports of her resignation and flight to India reached the public. The next day, Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Laureate and long-running chairman of the microfinance company known as Grameen Bank, was appointed as Chief Advisor, the head of the Interim Government of Bangladesh.
While the reform of the quota system and the resignation of Sheikh Hasina may seem like a triumph for the protesters, the subsequent appointment of Muhammad Yunus raises significant concerns. Yunus, a Nobel Peace Laureate with longstanding ties to Western institutions, was quickly installed as the interim Prime Minister—a move that has sparked debate about the real forces at play in this political shift. In a region historically wary of foreign influence, this development reflects a familiar pattern in other revolutions, where external powers, particularly the United States, exploit domestic unrest to position leaders more favorable to their geopolitical interests. The events in Bangladesh serve as a reminder of how genuine calls for change can be co-opted, making it critical for the Global South to remain vigilant against the subtle imposition of foreign-backed political change.
United States Involvement in the Movement
In recent years, Sheikh Hasina and her cabinet made several moves that undermined the geopolitical interests of the United States. She and her party, the Awami League, significantly improved ties with both China and India, aiming to formally join the BRICS nations.
BRICS is a grouping of emerging economies founded in 2009 on the premise that the international system is dominated by institutions serving the interests of Western powers and corporations at the expense of the nations of the Global South. By forming a bloc, BRICS aims to increase its influence in the global system and better serve the interests of the global majority. The group seeks to create alternative institutions to those established by the U.S. after the Second World War, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A key goal is to reduce or replace reliance on the U.S. dollar and challenge the economic sanctions wielded by the G7 bloc against nations perceived as threats to Western military and economic dominance. Today, BRICS comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Unsurprisingly, U.S. officials view the BRICS as a challenge to the institutional structure of the global order that favors Western corporate interests.
In September of 2021, Bangladesh, under Sheikh Hasina’s administration, joined the New Development Bank, the multilateral development bank established by BRICS. Hasina has emphasized the need for increased trade in local currencies to reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar, a sentiment echoed by the Asian Clearing Union (ACU), which recently agreed at a summit in Iran to launch a cross-border financial messaging system to rival the U.S.-controlled SWIFT payment network. Amongst ACU members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, and Iran. To add insult to injury for the United States, Bangladesh’s growing ties with China and Russia have seen the country increasingly use the Chinese currency, the renminbi, in commerce with Russia, especially after Western sanctions prevented Bangladesh from paying Russia in dollars for building a nuclear power plant. As de-dollarization accelerates across the globe, Bangladesh’s strategic moves under Hasina’s administration reflected its broader ambition to lessen reliance on the U.S. dollar and strengthen its ties with alternative economic powers.
At a press conference in June of 2023, Hasina announced: “We will join anything that benefits us. We are bound to do everything that is favorable for our people. The time has gone where there was no option but to lean on one party or take a side.” In the same statements made to the press, Hasina also announced that she would refuse to sell St. Martin’s Island to maintain her power. At the time, Hasina did not specify which foreign entity sought to control St. Martin’s Island, but following her resignation, she reportedly told her close associates that had she conceded the island to the U.S., she would still be in power. The island would offer the U.S. access to the Bay of Bengal and allow the U.S. military to block off the Strait of Malacca, a narrow stretch of water that serves as an entryway to the South China Sea for most of China’s oil imports. St. Martin’s Island also offers a major strategic advantage for the U.S. in its New Cold War with China as the location would allow surveillance of regional trade.
Under Hasina, Bangladesh made significant progress in relationships with India, China, and Russia — three key BRICS members, with China and Russia as political rivals of the United States. Improving ties between these countries leaves them less vulnerable and, therefore, less likely to acquiesce to exploitative demands from Western nations, especially the U.S. In December 2023, Russia’s embassy in Bangladesh released a statement warning of “instigating activities of Western diplomatic missions in Dhaka,” backing violent protests and predicting an “Arab Spring”-style color revolution. This prediction echoed concerns voiced by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who highlighted the risk of impending destabilization of Bangladesh, not a far-fetched concern given the US record of staging or abetting multiple coups, regime changes, and destabilizations aimed at punishing countries that defy its desires.
When periods of tumult arise in a country with a ruling government that is not fully subservient to the U.S., Western audiences are immediately exposed to a litany of news stories showcasing purported evidence of an authoritarian government. The mainstream U.S. and Western press ignore any popular support for such an administration and often exclusively interview a propertied or monied segment of the population. The public is led to believe that such a government must be overthrown or destabilized and replaced with a U.S.-friendly government. Bangladesh was no exception to this pattern.
On July 10, 2024, a little more than a month after the beginning of the protests opposing the quota ruling, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs published a report detailing Bangladesh’s investment climate. The report claimed that “Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling party, the Awami League, adopted legislation and policies that diminished space for the political opposition, undermined judicial independence, and threatened freedom of the media and civil society. Hasina, on January 7, 2024, was re-elected to her fourth consecutive term in an election assessed to be neither free nor fair amid jailing thousands of the opposition, mass opposition election boycotts, voting irregularities, and low voter turnout.” The report was released during mounting protests and reflected the U.S.’s critical stance on Hasina’s administration by highlighting alleged democratic backsliding. Such a portrayal prepared the ground for a leadership change favoring Western interests, underscoring the fine line between advocacy for democracy and interference in sovereign governance. Western media outlets championed the overthrow of Hasina in August and framed it as a shift toward the democratization of Bangladesh and an end to a dictatorship, all the while refraining from questioning the installation of an unelected Yunus.
Considering Yunus’s history, his swift appointment as interim leader raises critical questions. Yunus had gained international recognition for his work with Grameen Bank, a microfinance institution purportedly established to aid Bangladesh’s impoverished population. Microfinance has long since been shown to be ineffective, leaving many borrowers worse off than before. Loan recipients are often unable to repay their loans, and the interest rates are often exorbitant–sometimes exceeding 90% annually–making microfinance nothing more than a loan shark scheme preying on the most vulnerable segments of society. Despite the humanitarian image based on the false notion that microfinance is an effective antidote to poverty, Yunus’s relationship with Western governments—particularly the U.S.—complicates his role in the recent regime change. Grameen Bank was founded with partial Bangladeshi government ownership, allowing the state regulatory oversight of its leadership. However, leaked diplomatic cables from 2009 reveal Yunus’s meeting with U.S. Ambassador James F. Moriarty, during which he sought assistance to sidestep government authority, ensuring his indefinite control of Grameen Bank.
Over the years, Yunus established connections with prominent U.S. officials, including U.S. President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and USAID Administrator Samantha Power. He was recently honored by his longtime friend Bill Clinton at the Clinton Global Initiative for his role in microfinance, a predatory neoliberal practice that has long been promoted by Hilary Clinton. When Yunus was removed as chairman of Grameen Bank by the government of Bangladesh in March of 2011, Hilary Clinton spoke out against the move, claiming she was concerned such a decision would interfere with the bank’s “tremendous model.” During Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, she met with Yunus multiple times, most notably in May of 2012 when she expressed public support for him in opposition to Sheikh Hasina’s decision.
These relationships with powerful U.S. officials suggest a preference among Western powers for Yunus, given his alignment with neoliberal economic models and Western diplomatic goals. Yunus’s advocacy for microfinance, often viewed as a countermeasure to state programs, reflects neoliberal ideologies that promote market solutions. Microfinance provides loans to those in poverty, encouraging them to start small businesses. However, the idea that all the world’s woes would be solved if everyone were to become an entrepreneur is far from the truth. Yunus’s exploitative microfinance model even expanded into the U.S. with Grameen America, where the bank charges struggling members of Black, Indigenous, and Latin American communities an 18% interest rate on loans. Many poor farmers in the Global South are forced to sell what little land they till for survival to repay microfinance loans. India was faced with a wave of suicides in the early 2010s when hundreds of borrowers were forced to sell necessities and were sometimes even encouraged by loan agents to sell their children.
Muhammad Yunus was an early pioneer of the microfinance model and received his Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for the promotion and application of the model. However, Yunus’s approach ultimately serves U.S. economic interests more than the needs of Bangladesh’s population. Policies such as land redistribution, jobs programs, and labor laws that tackle the systemic roots of poverty are anathema to the neoliberal policy prescriptions; the latter favors the promotion of entrepreneurship, privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of finance and trade instead. Microfinance may lead to endless debt traps, but at least everyone is a small business owner!
U.S. officials have called for such neoliberal “economic reforms” in Bangladesh to benefit U.S. corporations. In meetings with the Chamber of Commerce corporate lobbyists in Dhaka, U.S. officials stated that “the American private sector can help unlock Bangladesh’s growth potential.” They highlighted areas such as energy security, data centers, and transportation, asserting that with the right economic reforms, U.S. businesses could play a positive role in many facets of Bangladesh’s economy, boosting trade and investment. This aligns with the broader U.S. agenda of promoting a market-friendly environment that caters to U.S. corporate interests while limiting the government’s ability to implement policies that would more directly address the structural causes of poverty.
The International Republican Institute (IRI), a U.S. nonprofit organization founded in 1983, played a significant role in the events leading up to the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s administration. The organization’s stated mission is to “advance freedom and democracy worldwide” and is primarily funded by the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Board members are typically prominent members of the Republican Party and include the likes of Dan Sullivan, Tom Cotton, Lindsey Graham, Mitt Romney, and Marco Rubio.
IRI’s website quotes Ronald Reagan’s 1982 speech to the British Parliament in which he calls upon “freedom-loving nations to foster the infrastructure of democracy in countries that are lacking any semblance of democratic development.” It was founded as one of the core institutes of the NED, itself well-known for promoting “democracy” worldwide through covert regime change operations. The IRI has been implicated in the 2004 coup d’etat in Haiti against Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president of Haiti who favored policies to eradicate poverty and was deeply critical of neoliberalism and U.S. interventionism. We should view both the NED and IRI alongside the CIA as the many arms of the U.S. government that bring about regime change in and destabilize targeted countries, with the two former organizations employed to mask such operations with deceptive discourse about “democracy promotion,” “good governance,” “authoritarianism,” and the like.
An IRI report submitted to the U.S. State Department titled “Promoting Accountability, Inclusivity, and Resiliency Support Program (PAIRS)” details the IRI’s activities in Bangladesh, dating from March 1, 2019, to December 31, 2020. The report summarized its activities as such:
To enhance the political participation of Bangladesh citizens and amplify anti-authoritarianism voices, IRI implemented a broad-based social empowerment project that fostered and expanded citizen-centered, local and non-traditional forums for political engagement. IRI issued 11 advocacy grants to artists, musicians, performers or organizations that created 225 art products addressing political and social issues that were viewed nearly 400,000 times; supported three civil society organizations (CSOs) from LGBTI, Bihari and ethnic communities to train 77 activists and engage 326 citizens to develop 43 specific policy demands, which were proposed before 65 government officials; and conducted community-specific quantitative and qualitative research, including three focus group reports and the largest published survey of LGBTI people in Bangladesh.
Note the irony: the conservative U.S. politicians, including the high-ranking officials who lead the IRI, often exhibit hostility toward the LGBTI communities within the U.S. as they attempt to manipulate concerns of such communities in countries they target for destabilization and regime change.
On several occasions, the report mentions power shifts and destabilization as the program’s objectives, most notably in a table mentioning “Key Activities” where the IRI details conducting interviews and identifying over 170 “democratic activists who would cooperate with IRI to destabilize Bangladesh’s politics.” This overt admission highlights the IRI’s intent to leverage civil society actors as tools for political interference under the guise of promoting democracy. Such actions exemplify how external interventions often exploit genuine grievances within marginalized communities to further geopolitical agendas rather than addressing the root causes of systemic inequality. By co-opting cultural and social movements, the IRI not only undermines the sovereignty of the targeted nation but also risks delegitimizing the struggles of those communities by tying them to foreign interests. This strategy aligns with broader patterns of U.S.-led regime change operations, where fostering dissent and destabilization serve as precursors to achieving strategic dominance.
Bangladesh’s political upheaval is emblematic of broader geopolitical struggles where local movements intersect with global interests. While the youth-led protests sought legitimate reforms, the aftermath—a Western-aligned interim government—raises questions about the true beneficiaries of this change. Yunus’s leadership, shaped by the history of his collaboration with Western institutions, suggests a potential rollback of policies that sought to strengthen Bangladesh’s sovereignty and align itself with the Global South.
Bangladesh’s people must remain vigilant as it navigates this critical juncture. The Global South has seen similar scenarios unfold, where changes initially driven by grassroots demands are redirected to serve external powers. Bangladesh’s future will depend on its ability to balance domestic aspirations with external pressures and ensure that its sovereignty and the welfare of its citizens remain a paramount concern.